The consequences of the Schrems case and eHealth by Verhenneman, Griet
In summer 2013 Max Schrems
filed a complaint with the Irish
Data Protection Authority (‘DPA’)
about Facebook Ireland Ltd.,
requesting an audit of the data
Facebook was passing to the US
National Security Agency (‘NSA’)
following the Snowden revelations.
The Snowden revelations showed
that Facebook Inc. participated
voluntarily in the US PRISM
programme, potentially
transferring personal data on EU
citizens. But, the Irish DPA
dismissed Schrems’ request,
arguing that national DPAs had no
authority to investigate
international transfers that took
place under a Commission
Adequacy Decision such as the
2000/520/EC decision.
Upon the dismissal of his
application, Max Schrems took the
case to the High Court in Dublin.
The Irish High Court decided to
request a preliminary ruling from
the CJEU questioning the
competence of national DPAs to
investigate data transfers under
Commission Adequacy Decisions.
In its request for a preliminary
ruling the Irish High Court
indicated that following the
Snowden revelations significant
questions were raised as to the
actual ability of the US to ensure
an adequate level of protection and
satisfy the requirements of articles
7 and 8 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights. 
Following this request the CJEU
first examined the distribution of
competences between national
DPAs and the EU Commission
(‘EC’) on Adequacy Decisions
taken on the basis of Article 25 of
the 95/46/EC Data Protection
Directive (‘DPD’). The court ruled
that such Adequacy Decisions are
binding on EU Member States and
can only be declared invalid by the
CJEU. Nevertheless national DPAs
do retain their full investigative
powers. Moreover, they have an
obligation to assess claims brought
before them. In other words: a
national DPA may not withdraw
itself from its obligation to
investigate claims by individuals by
stating that the EC has already
made a binding adequacy decision.
This is in line with previous rulings
of the CJEU stressing the function
of DPAs as guardians of the
fundamental right to data
protection.
Secondly, the CJEU examined the
validity of the Decision. First it
annuled Article 1 of the Decision,
stating that on the basis of the
Decision the EC cannot ensure an
adequate level of protection
through domestic law or
international commitments.
Secondly the court also annulled
Article 3, which limited the powers
of investigation of national DPAs.
The court found that such a
restriction exceeds the EC’s
competences.
With two of its main articles
declared invalid, the Decision is in
practice null and void. And
consequently the Schrems case
resulted in a judgment with
implications extending far beyond
its original context as it extends to
all data transfers between the EU
and the US, including transfers in
the eHealth context. The storage of
electronic health records, the use of
telemedicine solutions,
cooperation in clinical trials, the
deployment of wellness apps and
health trackers of all kinds - if they
involve the processing of personal
data under EU law, they are
potentially affected by the CJEU’s
judgment.
The Safe Harbor Decision:
unique in its kind
During the same period that Max
Schrems filed his complaint with
the Irish DPA, the EC tried but
failed at finding a political solution
to the pressure the Snowden
revelations put on the Decision.
Viviane Reding, then EC Vice
President, called for a review of the
Decision by the end of 2013. She
acknowledged that the Decision
“may not be so safe after all.” The
weakest points of the Decision
were listed as a) transparency, b)
the limited options for EU citizens
to enforce their rights and c) the
lack of monitoring of companies
operating under Safe Harbor, as
the agreement was based on self-
certification.
In this sense the Decision had
always been an Adequacy Decision
unique in its kind. The US has no
classical data protection laws, but
has instead a hybrid system
combining constitutional rights
against governmental intrusion
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Should medical doctors, clinical trial
researchers, or information
scientists in biotech or health
information management lose any
sleep over a case brought against
Facebook? Griet Verhenneman, of
the KU Leuven Centre for IT & IP
Law, believes they should. What
started as a request by Austrian
Maximillian Schrems to investigate
data transfers from Facebook
Ireland Ltd. to Facebook Inc.,
turned into a landmark judgment by
the European Court of Justice
(‘CJEU’) on international data
transfers, with far-reaching
consequences. The CJEU has
declared the US Adequacy
Decision, generally cited as the Safe
Harbor Decision (‘Decision’), null
and void. Consequently some
4,000 US companies, who transfer
data between the EU and the US
based on the Decision need to
review their data transfers, as Griet
explains. 
The consequences of the
Schrems case and eHealth
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Amsterdam Privacy Conference.
Jourova indicated that the new
framework that is being discussed
by the EU and the US would a)
include stronger oversight by the
US Department of Commerce to
ensure that companies comply, b)
establish free of charge redress
mechanisms, c) bring consumers
more transparency about the way
companies handle consumer data,
and d) include strict rules on the
further transfer of data to
additional parties. “This will
transform the system from a purely
self-regulating one to an oversight
system that is more responsive as
well as proactive and backed up by
significant enforcement, including
sanctions,” Jourova said.
When comparing Jourova’s 2015
statements to Reding’s statements,
they are not all that different. This
raises the question as to whether
the CJEU’s decision to declare all
transfers under the Decision
unlawful can put enough pressure
on the negotiations to finally make
progress. Clearly the CJEU’s
annullment of the Decision does
create an urge for advancements in
the discussions, but at the same
time, a fall back mechanism is still
available - at least for now. 
Article 26 DPD: a solution to
circumvent the judgment?
The ‘default’ rule available for
transfers to the US may have been
annulled, but Article 26 (1) and 26
(2) DPD do still offer the
opportunity to transfer personal
data to the US. 
Article 26 (1) provides an
exhaustive list of exemptions from
the central prohibition to transfer
data to third countries without an
adequate level of protection.
Assuming that there is no
discussion on the original legal
basis for the processing of health
data, data can subsequently be
transferred to the US for example
when:
! The data subject has given
his/her unambiguous consent
thereto;
! or the transfer is necessary in
order to protect the vital interests
of the data subject.
All of the exceptions under
Article 26 (1) need to be
interpreted restrictively. With
regard to transfers to protect the
vital interests of the data subject,
this means its use should be
limited to life-or-death situations. 
Obtaining unambiguous
informed consent from data
subjects could be an option for
example in clinical trials.
Unambiguous consent to transfer
the data to the US can be obtained
at the time written consent is
obtained for participation in the
clinical trial. Also with regard to
the use of mHealth apps, informed
consent can fairly easily be
obtained from the data subject at
the time of registration. This is of
course on the condition that the
notification to the data subject
about the data transfer is not
hidden in some small print general
conditions. Such informed consent
could hardly be called
‘unambiguous.’ Additionally it
must be noted that informed
consent in the context of data
transfers should be freely given. It
is questionable if informed consent
can still be considered freely given
if the customer has no other
option but to agree with the
transfer of his/her data. But not in
all eHealth scenarios is informed
consent such a valid option.
Informed consent is for example
troublesome in cases of processing
biomedical samples or genetic or
genomic information, first of all
because these types of data
concern not just one data subject,
but also potentially other persons.
Secondly, the use of biomedical
samples for research is often linked
to broad or blanket consent, two
concepts that are still contested
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and a scattered set of specific laws
on the use of commercial
information. In itself the US legal
framework was not considered
equivalent to European standards,
but the EC agreed that when US
companies commit to the
Decision, they operate under a
framework which provides an
adequate level of protection. The
Decision thus differs from other
adequacy decisions in the sense
that it is a framework additional to
the legal framework offered by
domestic laws and international
commitments, and in the sense
that this framework is based on
self-certification. 
Safe Harbor 2.0
Julie Brill, Federal Trade
Commissioner (‘FTC’), reflected
on these differences in her speech
at the Amsterdam Privacy
Conference. “The FTC with its
many years of experience and
nearly 100 privacy and security
enforcement actions  - not
counting [the] 40 actions involving
safe harbor issues - has been a
highly important and highly expert
force,” she said. But, “The [CJEU]
decision crystallizes what has been
clear - or should have been clear -
for a long time about privacy in
Europe: it is a fundamental right
that Europeans and their Court
take very seriously.” Looking out to
the future, she continued by stating
that: “we should create a new data
transfer mechanism that
strengthens the privacy protections
that were in the Safe Harbor
principles” and that everyone
understands “the need to ensure
that these substantive protections
are more robust.” 
The message of Commissioner
Brill aligns with the message that
European Commissioner Vera
Jourova sent in the aftermath of
the Data Protection and Privacy
Commissioners meeting in
Amsterdam, which followed the
The storage
of EHRs, the
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telemedicine
solutions,
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in clinical
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of wellness
apps and
health
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they involve
the
processing of
personal data
under EU law,
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potentially
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the CJEU
judgment
under European data protection
law. Obtaining informed consent is
also probably not so obvious when
healthcare professionals or
healthcare institutions wish to
engage with US companies offering
cloud-based storage and
computation solutions. In such a
case it would be highly impractical
to have to obtain informed consent
from every single patient before
transferring their data. 
With regard to the latter problem,
it is however worth considering the
solution offered by Article 26 (2) of
the DPD, under which personal
data can also be transferred to
third countries when an adequate
level of protection is reached
through the use of appropriate
contractual clauses or binding
corporate rules. Appropriate
contractual clauses are a set of
clauses specifically regulating the
data transfer between the data
controller and data processor. They
can consist of the standard
contractual clauses as pre-
approved by the EC or of ad hoc
clauses approved by a national
DPA. Binding corporate rules are
legally binding data processing
rules adopted by a company or a
group of companies to create a safe
haven for data transfers within a
corporate group.    
However, it seems many or all of
the mechanisms under Article 26
are hanging by a thread. The CJEU
not only indicated that the EC
misjudged the Decision, but it also
emphasised the powers of national
DPAs to independently review, and
potentially suspend or sanction,
international data transfers. The
Article 29 Working Party (‘WP29’)
and the German DPA have already
sent a clear message following up
on this responsibility. They will not
tolerate data transfers to third
countries where there is no broad
analysis of the third country’s
domestic laws and international
commitments. Such transfers will
not be tolerated under an
Adequacy Decision, but neither
will they be tolerated under the
other instruments foreseen by the
DPD such as those of Article 26. 
The WP29 set the deadline for
reaching an agreement with US
authorities as the end of January
2016, but German DPAs
announced they will immediately
begin investigating data transfers to
the US and will not be granting
new approvals. The WP29 stressed
that “businesses should reflect on
the eventual risks they take when
transferring data and should
consider putting in place any legal
and technical solutions in a timely
manner to mitigate those risks and
respect the EU data protection
acquis.” Hamburg’s Data Protection
Commissioner Johannes Caspar
had even stronger words: “Anyone
who wants to remain untouched
by the legal and political
implications of the judgement,
should in the future consider
storing personal data only on
servers within the European
Union.” 
Conclusion
Since actors in the eHealth domain
are dealing with sensitive
information, the call for businesses
to reflect on the risks of
transferring data should be taken
seriously. National legislations and
attitudes with regard to the
processing of health data differ
between EU Member States, but in
most Member States healthcare
professionals do have a natural
sense of circumspection linked to
the Hippocratic Oath. As a result
cloud-based solutions for the
storage of healthcare records for
example have only recently begun
to see adoption. More than in
other sectors, contracts on cloud-
based storage and computation
already stipulate that data are not
to leave the EU. But in many other
healthcare sectors such as medical
research, where openness is the key
to advancement, the contrary will
be true and restricting data
transfers to the EU only would
probably not be beneficial for
mankind.
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